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In this paper, three theories of progress and the aim of science are discussed: (i) the theory of progress as
increasing explanatory power, advocated by Popper in The logic of scientific discovery (1935/1959); (ii) the
theory of progress as approximation to the truth, introduced by Popper in Conjectures and refutations
(1963); (iii) the theory of progress as a steady increase of competing alternatives, which Feyerabend put
forward in the essay “Reply to criticism. Comments on Smart, Sellars and Putnam” (1965) and defended
as late as the last edition of Against method (1993). It is argued that, contrary to what Feyerabend scholars
have predominantly assumed, Feyerabend’s changing attitude towards falsificationismdwhich he often
advocated at the beginning of his career, and vociferously attacked in the 1970s and 1980sdmust be
explained by taking into account not only Feyerabend’s very peculiar view of the aim of science, but also
Popper’s changing account of progress.
 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Science1. Introduction
Paul Feyerabend’s changing attitude towards falsificationism is a
much debated issue within the historiography of the Popperian
school in philosophy of science. As is well-known, Feyerabend
made a name for himself by passionately advocating the Popperian
outlookda pretty remarkable instance being his lectures entitled
Knowledge without foundations (1962a), which repeat (in some
passages almost verbatim) large parts of Karl Popper’s famous
essay “Back to the Presocratics” (1959). At some point in the 1960s,
however, Feyerabend turned his back on his former mentor, and in
the 1970s and 1980s he became a vociferousdperhaps the most
vociferousdcritic of falsificationism.
Conflicting accounts of such turndand of the later Feyerabend’s
rageful replies to thosewho dared tomention his previous embrace
of Popper’s ideasdhave been offered (see Collodel, forthcoming, for
a state-of-the-art discussion of the issue). To name but two ex-
amples, John Watkins has suggested that the later Feyerabend’s
derogatory remarks on falsificationism were due to his desire tocover up an “unwanted indebtedness to Popper” (2000, p. 49),
while Eric Oberheim has forcefully argued that, although Feyer-
abend used very freely some of Popper’s ideas, he rejected falsifi-
cationism as early as the beginning of the 1960s and he “was never
a member of the Popperian school” (2006, p. 78; see also
Hoyningen-Huene & Oberheim, 2000). As these examples show,
there is a continued disagreement between, on the one hand, in-
terpreters who view the early Feyerabend as someone striving to
contribute to the development of Popper’s research program and,
on the other hand, interpreters who argue that as early as in the
first half of the 1960s he aimed at proposing a theory of science
which would eventually displace falsificationism. In what follows,
we shall remain neutral with respect to such debate: the main aim
of the present paper is, more modestly, to point out that in-
terpreters have oftentimes taken falsificationism to be a kind of
fixed anchorage in the reconstruction of Feyerabend’s trajectory. To
put it differently, it has often been assumed that Popper’s philos-
ophy provides a gooddif not the idealdbackground against which
to reconstruct Feyerabend’s work, among other things in view of
the fact that falsificationism is a fixed system of ideas to which in
different moments Feyerabend reacted, not without idiosyncrasies,
in different ways.
1 Besides openly acknowledging the prescriptive character of his methodological
rules, Popper insisted on the descriptive adequacy of the method of conjectures and
refutations, i.e., on the fact that it captures the best practice of great scientists. For a
discussion of some problems facing Popper’s view of methodology, see e.g., Preston
(1994).
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the hardcore of falsificationism that Popper never relinquished,
among which the view that the method of conjectures and refu-
tations, capturing the essence of good science, promotes progress.
Nevertheless, Feyerabend scholars seem to have generally under-
estimated an important change which took place within Popper’s
philosophy between the end of the 1950s and the early 1960s, and
which concerned axiological matters. More specifically, in The logic
of scientific discovery Popper had defended a theory of science in
which, as he remarked, “it is possible to avoid using the concepts
‘true’ and ‘false’” (2002a [1935/1959], p. 273), and progress is
viewed as a matter of finding corroborated theories exhibiting
increasing explanatory and predictive power. Subsequently, in
Chapter 10 of Conjectures and refutations (1963) he defended the
view that scientific progress can be accounted for in terms of the
increasing approximation to the truth of our theories, and was the
first to put forward a formal explication of the notion of verisi-
militude (or, equivalently, truthlikeness). Feyerabend was never
willing to embrace Popper’s second theory of progress, which
conflicts with the theory of progress as a steady increase of
competing alternatives that do not converge towards the truthda
theory that he put forward in the seminal essay “Reply to criticism.
Comments of Smart, Sellars and Putnam” (1981c [1965]) and
defended as late as the last edition of Against method (1993). As we
shall argue, when the attempt is made to explain Feyerabend’s
changing attitude towards falsificationism, an accurate account
ought to include not only Feyerabend’s move away from Popper’s
ideas, but also Popper’s move away from his own originary view of
the aim of science.
The focus of our discussion will then be on the three theories of
progress and the aim of science alluded to in the title of this paper.
In Section 2, after a cursory recap of the basic tenets of falsifica-
tionism, Popper’s two theories of progress will be introduced. In
Section 3, as a way of preparation for the analysis of Feyerabend’s
theory of progress, his pluralistic model of theory testing, revolving
around the claim that a severe test of a theory T requires to take into
consideration not only the available evidence, but also alternatives
to T, will be illustrated. A special emphasis will be put on the mixed
standing of Feyerabend’s views on theory testing and proliferation,
which although showcasing his Popperian ancestry (as recently
emphasized by Bschir, forthcoming), also led him, by the mid-
1960s, outside the falsificationist orthodoxy. In Section 4, Feyer-
abend’s theory of progress as a steady increase of competing al-
ternatives, wedded to his views on theory testing and proliferation,
will be analyzed. In Section 5, some brief concluding remarks will
be offered.
2. Popper’s two theories of progress
The issue of scientific progress always played a central role
within the philosophy of Popper, who famously took the growth of
knowledge to be the most important problem of epis-
temologydone which, he claimed, “can be studied best by studying
the growth of scientific knowledge” (2002a [1935/1959], p. XIX). As
we shall see, in different moments he put forward two different
theories of progress and the aim of science; nevertheless, Popper
always maintained that scientific inquiry ought to proceed ac-
cording to the principles of his proposed alternative to the induc-
tivist view of scientific method, i.e., the method of conjectures and
refutations.
According to Popper, the inductivist claim that scientific inquiry
takes off with the accumulation of observations, from which the-
ories are then inductively inferred, is plainly wrong: all life is
problem solving, and inquiry in science, not unlike in everyday life,
arts, politics, etc., is triggered by the researcher’s attempt to solvesome problem by putting forward a theory, hypothesis, or conjec-
ture. However, there is one feature that distinguishes the theories
belonging to the domain of empirical science: scientific theories
can conflict with experience in such a way that experience can
prove them false. The basic tenet of falsificationism is then the view
that the falsifiability of theories provides a criterion of demarca-
tiondthe falsifiability criteriondwhich allows one to tell science
from non-science.
More precisely, let a basic-statement be a statement describing a
singular fact, for instance, the fact that a certain swan is black.
According to Popper’s criterion of demarcation, a theory Tdfor
instance, the theory according to which all swans are whitedis
scientific iff there are basic-statements with which T is incompat-
ible, or equivalently, that are forbidden by T, and such that, if they
were true, T would be false. Such basic-statements are called by
Popper the ‘potential falsifiers’ of T, and constitute its ‘empirical
content’dthat is, the amount of information concerning the world
conveyed by T. The greater the empirical content of a theory T, the
more interesting T is: a theory which is incompatible with many
basic-statements and which, besides explaining already known
facts, also makes surprising predictions, runs the risk of being
falsified because it says many things about the world, and therefore
qualifies, in Popper’s jargon, as a bold conjecture.
Another basic tenet of falsificationism is that, once a theory has
been proposed, scientists ought to severely test it, aiming at its
refutation. The tests are performed by deducing from Tdin
conjunctionwith theso-called ‘backgroundknowledge’dpredictions
that are then confronted with the basic-statements accepted by the
scientific community, which describe the available evidence (that is,
basically, the observations and the results of experiments). If the
predictions deduced from T are compatible with such basic-
statements, T is said to have been corroborated by experience.
However, according to Popper one can never attribute a positive
probability to a universal theory, no matter how well corroborated:
scientists embrace a corroborated theory as a satisfactory solution to
the problem at hand only provisionally and tentatively, and proceed
to subject such solution to further, more severe, tests. If the pre-
dictions deduced from T are incompatible with the accepted basic-
statements, T is said to have been falsified, and it should be
replaced by some new conjecture providing scientists with an as yet
untested, but presumably more satisfactory solution to the problem
that they are investigating.
The method of conjectures and refutations revolves, unsur-
prisingly, around the falsifiability criterion, which Popper charac-
terized as the “supreme rule” (2002a [1935/1959], p. 33) of his
methodology: all the other rules that he devised follow from it,
although not in a strictly logical or deductive way, but rather in the
sense that, taken together, they are aimed at guaranteeing that no
scientific statement will be protected against falsification.1 The
falsifiability criterion is, Popper claimed, “a proposal for an agree-
ment or convention” which ought to guide the activity of those who
hold dear such values as critical discussion and freedom from
dogmatism, and are therefore moved by the desire to tackle “new
and unexpected questions, challenging us to try out new and
hitherto undreamed-of answers” (2002a [1935/1959], p. 15).
Therefore, in The logic of scientific discovery Popper put forward his
first theory of progress, according to which science pursues an
“infinite yet attainable aim: that of ever discovering new, deeper
2 Notoriously, Popper downplayed the differences between his two theories of
progress, claiming that Tarski’s theory of truth contributed to clarify his views on
science and its philosophy but did not change them significantly (2002a [1935/
1959], p.273, fn. *1). Nevertheless, as our discussion here shows, the theory of
progress as increasing approximation to the truth, anything but implicit in The logic
of scientific discovery, makes claims concerning the aim of scientific inquiry that
Popper’s first theory of progress does not make and faces problems that cannot
arise within the context of the theory of progress as increasing explanatory power,
such as that of the alleged link between corroboration and verisimilitude. For a
classical discussion of the problems facing Popper’s second theory of progress see
Dilworth (2007), esp. chap. 5.
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answers to ever renewed and ever more rigorous tests” (2002a
[1935/1959], p. 281). Or, as he more concisely put it in “The aim
of science,” scientific inquiry is after “satisfactory explanations, of
whatever strikes us as being in need of explanation” (1957, p. 24).
Scientific progress is thus a matter of finding better and better
explanations, that is, corroborated theories of ever greater gener-
ality, exhibiting increasing explanatory and predictive power: “a
theory that has been well corroborated can only be superseded by
one of a higher level of universality” (2002a [1935/1959], p. 276).
This means that, within a progressive series of theories, each suc-
cessive theory is better testabledit has more empirical contentd,
deals with deeper problems than the previous one, and “contains
the old, well corroborated theorydor at least a good approximation
to it” (2002a [1935/1959], p. 276).
As mentioned above Popper maintained that, based on the tests
which it survived, an unfalsified theory can be viewed as the best
among its competitors, and therefore worth of selection for further
critical discussion, but in spite of a theory’s success inwithstanding
severe tests, one can never conclude that it is true: once the ideal of
demonstrably certain knowledge has been dispensed with, and a
thoroughly fallibilist stance has been embraced, all scientific
statements come to be viewed as “tentative for ever” (2002a [1935/
1959], p. 280). In fact, the test of a theory consists in the comparison
of the predictions deduced from it with a set of basic-statements,
which the scientific community tentatively accepts as de-
scriptions of certain aspects of the world; therefore a theory that
has passed a test is said to be corroborated not in any absolute
sense, but only with respect to the relevant set of basic-statements.
Consequently, what Popper called the ‘degree of corroboration’ of a
theory is to be viewed as nothing but a summary of the current
state of the critical discussion concerning the merits of the theory,
which comes with a subscript attached, characterizing “the system
of basic statements towhich the corroboration relates (for example,
by the date of its acceptance)” (2002a [1935/1959], p. 275). In this
regard, Popper openly remarked that within his theory of science,
the concepts ‘true’ and ‘false’ are dispensable (2002a [1935/1959],
p. 273)dand indeed, until “The aim of science” (1957), he studi-
ously avoided talk of truth when discussing axiological issues.
Popper would later claim that it was only thanks to the work of
Alfred Tarski that his hesitation to speak of ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ was
swept away. If Popper’s recollections in this regard can be relied
upon, not long after the completion of the German edition of The
logic of scientific discovery, Tarski explained to him “(in the Volks-
garten in Vienna) the idea of his definition of the concept of truth”
as correspondence to the facts, and he immediately “realized how
important it was, and that he had finally rehabilitated the much
maligned correspondence theory of truth” (2002b [1974], p. 112;
see also 2002a [1935/1959], p. 273, fn. *1). However, it was only
between the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s that
Popper put forward his second theory of progress, i.e., the theory of
progress as increasing approximation to the truth. More specif-
ically, in Conjectures and refutations he devised an explication of the
notion of verisimilitude, or equivalently, truthlikeness (see 1963,
pp. 231e234 and 391e397). Based on such explication, he declared
that “we simply cannot do without something like this idea of a
better or worse approximation to truth” (1963, p. 232), since what
we want to say when a theory T2 replaces a theory T1 is that T2
corresponds to the facts better than its predecessor. For instance,
such a theory-change as the transition from Newton’s to Einstein’s
theory can be regarded as progressive because, although the new
theory is, strictly speaking, presumably false (if only because it
involves the use of idealizing assumptions), it is, by our lights,
closer to the truth than the superseded one. As Popper later put it in
Objective knowledge, “while we can never have sufficiently goodarguments in the empirical sciences for claiming that we have
actually reached the truth, we can have strong and reasonably good
arguments for claiming that we may have made progress towards
the truth” (1972, pp. 57e58). The main cognitive aim of scientific
inquiry is then characterized, within Popper’s second theory of
progress, as increasing approximation to the truth: “In the search
for knowledge, we are out to find out true theories, or at least
theories which are nearer than others to the truth” (1963, p. 226),
where following Tarski, truth is construed as correspondence to the
facts.2
Popper hastened to add that one has to distinguish between the
logical problem of verisimilitude, which consists in providing a
definition of verisimilitude such that a comparison of any two
theories with respect to their closeness to the, supposedly known,
truth is possible, and the epistemic problem of verisimilitude,
which consists in devising a method to assess the degree of veri-
similitude of theories based on the available evidence. Concerning
the former problem, Popper believed that his explication solved it;
concerning the latter, he claimed to have already solved it in The
logic of scientific discovery: the method of conjectures and refuta-
tions, he argued, constitutes “the proper methodological counter-
part” (1963, p. 235) to the idea of verisimilitude.
For our present purposes it needs to be noted, first of all, that
although Popper claimed that his old methodology remained in
place unaltered, following the introduction of his new theory of
progress, the rules of the method of conjectures and refutations
required at least some reinterpretation. In fact, according to Pop-
per’s first theory of progress, a scientific community that aims at
finding corroborated theories of ever greater explanatory and
predictive power ought to select for further critical discussion,
among competing unfalsified theories, the more corroborated
theory exhibiting the greater explanatory and predictive power. In
other words, according to the theory of science defended in The
logic of scientific discovery, merely playing the game of science by its
rules suffices, in a sense, to reach the aim of the game, given that
one cannot draw any sharp distinction between the aim pursued
and the means used to pursue it. Not that coming up with con-
jectures possessing the desired features is a mechanical task: quite
on the contrary, Popper declared that “every discovery contains ‘an
irrational element,’ or ‘a creative intuition,’ in Bergson’s sense”
(2002a [1935/1959], p. 8), and acknowledged that good theories are
anything but easy to come by. In any case, when in Conjectures and
refutations Popper put forward his second theory of progress, the
question arosewhether the falsificationist rules of method are good
means for pursuing the aim of approximation to the truth, and
more specifically, whether a link between a theory’s high degree of
corroboration and its possessing a high degree of verisimilitude can
be shown to obtain (a question that Imre Lakatos, 1978 [1974] and
Adolf Grünbaum, 1976, among others, answered in the negative).
While relentlessly defending his methodology, Popper sometimes
issued contradictory statements in this regard. To mention but two
examples, in a 1972 Addendum to The logic of scientific discovery he
emphatically denied that the degree of corroboration is a measure
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critics that he prepared for the volume of The library of living phi-
losophers devoted to his work he admitted: “I did suggest in Con-
jectures and Refutations, Chapter 10, that the degree of
corroboration may be taken as an indication of verisimilitude”
(1974, p. 1011).
Secondly, despite Popper’s confidence, in 1974 his explication of
verisimilitude was proven inadequate: based on it, a false theory
can never be closer to the truth than another (true or false) theory,
so that the Popperian notion of verisimilitude turned out to be
inapplicable to the comparison between false theories (see Miller,
1974; Tichý, 1974)dthat is, in the scientifically most interesting
cases. Indeed, such an inadequacy of Popper’s explication put once
again under the spotlight what Lakatos always took to
bedindependently of the problems of Popper’s notion of ver-
isimilitudedthe major weakness of the methodology of conjec-
tures and refutations, that is, its inability to account for the fact that
scientists deal all the time with already falsified theories. When a
theory shows enough promise, Lakatos argued, the scientific
community behaves in a clearly non-falsificationist way and, con-
trary to Popper’s recommendations, does not treat known coun-
terexamples as reasons to get rid of it: “Some of the research
programmes now held in highest esteem by the scientific com-
munity progressed in an ocean of anomalies” (Lakatos 1978 [1974],
p. 147).3
The issues that arose following the introduction of Popper’s
second theory of progress, however, need not concern us further.
What matters here is, rather, that in spite of the technical diffi-
culties encountered by his approach to verisimilitude, Popper
continued to stress the importance of the intuitive idea of
approximation to the truth as the regulative ideal of scientific in-
quiry. As we shall see in Section 4, Popper’s intuitions in this respect
clashed with those of Feyerabend, who from 1965 onwards
embraced the very peculiar view that knowledge is “an ever-
increasing ocean of alternatives” (1981c [1965], p. 107) which do
not converge towards the truth; as we shall show, such a view goes
hand in hand with Feyerabend’s defense of theoretical pluralism,
which originated within the context of Popper’s views on theory
testing.4
3. Feyerabend on theory testing and proliferation
Throughout all of his career, Feyerabend passionately advocated
theoretical pluralism, which he supported by means of various
strategies. For instance, one of his favorite lines of argument always
was to insist that the proliferation of alternatives to the accepted
point of view is desirable since it promotes the full flourishing of
human faculties, and he often contrasted such an advantage of
pluralism with the narrow-mindedness resulting from the exclu-
sive commitment to one paradigm that characterizes, among
others, the Kuhnian scientist (see, e.g., 1970, as well as Lloyd’s 2000
[1997] insightful discussion). Moreover, especially from the 1970s3 Since 1975, various theories of verisimilitude based on explications of the
notion that avoid the flaws of Popper’s approach have been proposed (see, e.g.,
Kuipers, 1987, 2000; Niiniluoto, 1987; Oddie, 1986; and see Oddie, 2014 for a survey
of these post-Popperian theories of verisimilitude). Post-Popperian verisimilitude
theorists as Kuipers and Niiniluoto have developed non-falsificationist methodol-
ogies based on the insight that a falsified theory may well be the closest to the truth
among the available alternatives.
4 As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, Feyerabend seems to have explicitly
denied any link between corroboration and verisimilitude as early as 1962, in a
passage of “Explanation, reduction and empiricism” which was removed in the
1981 reprint of this essay in his Philosophical papers: “Even the stability of a testable
hypothesis cannot be regarded as a sign of factual truth. [.] There is no sign by
which factual truth may be recognized” (1962b, p. 70, fn. 86).onwards, he forcefully disputed the claim that modern science is
the onlydor the bestdway to investigate the world. Non-scientific
approaches or traditions, Feyerabend argued, allow their practi-
tioners to acquire valuable insights into the workings of nature: his
call for pluralism extended well beyond the realm of scientific in-
quiry (see especially Farewell to reason, 1987, and the materials
collected in the posthumous, unfinished Conquest of abundance,
1999a). In any case, the backbone of Feyerabend’s advocacy of
proliferationwithin science was provided by an argument which he
put forward in the early 1960s and proposed time and time again,
until the end of his career. The argument, aimed at establishing that
absent proliferation, severe testing of theories is impossible, starts
with an attack against “the assumption of the relative autonomy of
facts, or the autonomy principle” (1999b [1963], p. 91).
According to such principle, the facts which constitute the
empirical content of a certain theory T are available to the scientific
community independently of the consideration of alternatives to T.
In Feyerabend’s view, the principle underlies a monistic model of
theory testing characterized by the claim that “a single theory is
comparedwith a class of facts (or observation statements)which are
assumed to be ‘given’ somehow” (1999b [1963], p. 91). Themonistic
model, Feyerabend argued, is fatally flawed, since it leads to neglect
that facts and theories exhibit a much more intimate connection:
Not only is the description of every single fact dependent on
some theory (which may, of course, be very different from the
theory to be tested). There exist also facts which cannot be
unearthed except with the help of alternatives to the theory to
be tested, and which become unavailable as soon as such al-
ternatives are excluded (1999b [1963], pp. 91e92).
In other words, in order to severely test a theory T, it is not enough
to consider the empirical consequences of T and the available evi-
dence: some facts which may refute T can only be discovered by
deploying at least one alternative T 0 to T. Therefore, Feyerabend
argued, the monistic modeldwhich he viewed as “clearly implied
in almost all investigations which deal with questions of confir-
mation and test” (1999b [1963], p. 91)dought to be replaced with a
pluralistic model of theory testing, revolving around the following
maxim: “The methodological unit to which we must refer when
discussing questions of test and empirical content is constituted by
a whole set of partly overlapping, factually adequate, but mutually
inconsistent theories” (1999b [1963], p. 92).
Notoriously, the thesis that certain shortcomings of a theory can
be revealed only by using alternatives to it has commanded a great
deal of critical attention, and in most cases commentators have
doubted the viability of Feyerabend’s defense of theoretical
pluralism (see esp. Farrell, 2003, chap. 5, and Preston, 1997, chap. 7,
for extended discussions of the relevant literature). Here, however,
we shall not address the merits of Feyerabend’s argument for
proliferation. Rather, we shall aim at emphasizing, first of all, how
deeply rooted such argument was in the Popperian framework; and
secondly, how far Feyerabend pushed the argument away from
Popper’s ideas on theory testing.
Both before and after his break with Popper, Feyerabend
admitted that Popper’s work provided the starting point of his own
investigations. In this regard it is interesting to mention, first of all,
that as Matteo Collodel forcefully argues (forthcoming, esp. fn. 31),
the very language used by Feyerabend to couch his criticism of the
monistic model of theory testingdas well as of the accounts of
explanation and reduction favored by the Logical Empiri-
cistsdexhibits what seems to be a distinctively Popperian pedigree.
For instance, in the opening sentence of his classical “Explanation,
reduction and empiricism,” Feyerabend declared that his criticism
was intended to apply to the test of theories exhibiting a very high
level of generality (such as, for instance, Newton’s theory), towhich
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‘noninstantial theory’ and germane expressions, while absent from
the vocabulary of Logical Empiricism before Ernest Nagel imported
them in (1961), were used in the Popperian circle in the 1950s.
Secondly, as Karim Bschir (forthcoming, Sect. 1) has pointed out,
although commentators have in many cases taken for granted that,
according to Feyerabend, Popper figured prominently among the
proponents of the monistic model, “there is hardly any passage in
Feyerabend where he associates Popper with the monistic model”
of theory testing, for the very good reason that, as his pupil
Feyerabend was aware, Popper did not put forward such a model.
And indeed, as is well-known, in a passage of “Explanation,
reduction and empiricism” which Feyerabend removed when his
earlier essays were collected in the two volumes of the Philosophical
papers (1981a; 1981b), he credited Popper with being the first to
point out “the need, in the process of the refutation of a theory, for
at least another theory” (1962b, p. 32).5 It seems difficult to over-
estimate Popper’s influence on Feyerabend’s argument in defense
of pluralism, and in what is, to date, the most wide-ranging
investigation on the compatibility between Feyerabendian theo-
retical pluralism and Popperian critical rationalism, Bschir has
persuasively argued that Feyerabend’s ideas on theory proliferation
“must be seen as an extension of certain ideas that Karl Popper had
already formulated in his Logic of Scientific Discovery” (forthcoming,
Sect. 1).
To our mind, the keyword in the passage just quoted is certainly
‘extension.’ For, as Bschir openly acknowledges, Feyerabend quickly
moved away from Popper’s ideas on theory testing.
In this regard one must recall, first of all, that according to
Popper the distinctive feature of scientific theories lies in their
having empirical content, which guarantees that experience can
prove them false. Besides unhesitatingly seconding Popper in this
regard, Feyerabend took one further step and argued that empiri-
cism requires the increase of the empirical content, and therefore of
the testability, of the accepted theory T via the proliferation of as
many alternatives as possible: “the basic principle of empiricism”
he claimed, prescribes “to increase the empirical content of what-
ever knowledge we claim to possess” (1962b, p. 66; see also, e.g.,
1999b [1963], p. 93). Popper, on his part, did not take the empirical
content of a theory T to be something that depends on the alter-
natives to T, and therefore never explicitly recommended the in-
crease of the number of alternatives to T as a way of maximizing its
testability (on this, see esp. Bschir, forthcoming, Sect. 4.1; Worrall,
1978). Thus, Feyerabend pushed to the extreme Popper’s lesson
that theories are not appraised by comparing them to brute facts,
but rather, to the so-called ‘basic-statements,’ i.e., linguistic entities
purporting to describe certain aspects of the world. More precisely,
in The logic of scientific discovery Popper argued that a theory is
considered as falsified only if the scientific community accepts
basic-statements contradicting the predictions that have been
deduced from it, and such basic-statements describe some “repro-
ducible effect” (2002a [1935/1959], p. 66): a falsification takes place
when the community comes to accept a certain kind of low-level
empirical hypothesis which Popper labeled “falsifying hypothesis”
(2002a [1935/1959]). This means that the potential falsifiers of
scientific theories are in fact, according to Popper, other theories;
and as John Preston (1997, p. 134) pointed out, Feyerabend saw no
reason to restrict the pool of candidate falsifying hypotheses to
low-level ones: rather, he believed that fully fledged, high-level
theories provide the best means to severely test the theory that5 Feyerabend added: “As far as I am aware, this point has been made previously
by K. R. Popper in his lectures on scientific method which I attended in 1948 and
1952” (1962b, p. 32, fn. 9).happens to be accepted at a given time. Based on his construal of
the notions of empirical content and potential falsifier, Feyerabend
went on to champion theory proliferation as no less than “an
essential part of the empirical method” (1999b [1963], p. 93) and to
put forward the principle of proliferation: “Invent and elaborate
theories which are inconsistent with the accepted point of view, even if
the latter should happen to be highly confirmed and generally
accepted” (1981c [1965], p. 105).
Secondly, after arguing that in order to perform severe theory
testing one should use a set of “partly overlapping, factually
adequate, but mutually inconsistent theories” (1999b [1963], p. 92;
see also 1962b, p. 66), Feyerabend soon relaxed the requirement of
factual adequacy. He started Sect. 2 of the essay “Reply to criticism.
Comments on Smart, Sellars and Putnam”with the claim that “[n]ot
all alternatives are equally suited for the purpose of criticism”
(1981c [1965], p. 109), and then articulated a number of strict
desiderata that what he called “strong alternatives”dthat is, the-
ories which have the potential for displacing their rivalsdought to
satisfy. And although Feyerabend did not explicitly blame his
former mentor for embracing a naïve form of falsificationism (an
accusation which at later stages he was more than happy to make),
he went much farther than Popper would have allowed in insisting
on the critical role of falsified theories.6 In Sect. 1 of the same paper,
Feyerabend was adamant in claiming that the principle of prolif-
eration, besides recommending the invention of alternatives to the
established view, “prevents the elimination of older theories which
have been refuted” (1981c [1965], p. 107), due to the fact that “such
theories contribute to the content of their victorious rivals” (1981c
[1965], p. 107). Such cases as the history of heliocentrism and of
atomism, Feyerabend argued, show that “antediluvian, preposter-
ous ideas [.] may yet be turned against ‘modern’ views and may
even succeed in overthrowing them” (1981c [1965], p. 108). History
shows that “things can never be regarded as settled,” and that
ruling out the “possibility of a ‘criticism from the past’” (1981c
[1965], p. 108) would mean to deprive ourselves of an extremely
precious resource, since even discredited theories “may be said to
possess a ‘utopian’ component in the sense that they provide
lasting, and steadily improving, measuring sticks of adequacy”
(1981c [1965], p. 107) for the theories which we now happen to
accept. In the first edition of Against method Feyerabend went so far
as to explicitly suggest that the condition of factual adequacy of
alternatives ought to be “removed” (1975, p. 41, fn. 8), but even
absent such an explicit suggestion, it seems quite clear that as early
as 1965 he had walked, although not without some hesitations, a
long distance from Popper’s account of theory testing.
Finally, it is quite surprising that, as Collodel (forthcoming, fn. 31)
has pointed out, Popper used the term ‘inkommensurabel’dwhich
Popper himself translated into English as “non-comparable” (2002a
[1935/1959], p. 98)das early as 1935, in the German edition of The
logic of scientific discovery. However, the termwas used by Popper to
refer to cases in which the classes of the potential falsifiers of two
theories T1 and T2 intersect but none of the two classes is included in
the other, or the two classes have no common elements, so that the
falsifiability of T1 and T2 cannot be compared with the help of the
subclass relation. Feyerabend, on his part, employed the notion of
incommensurability in “Explanation, reduction and empiricism”
within the context of the appraisal of theories. More specifically, he
argued against the accounts of explanation and reduction favored by
the Logical Empiricists bydiscussingat length (1962b, pp. 52e60) the
relationship between the impetus theory of motion (T1) and New-
tonian mechanics (T2), i.e., a pair of theories allegedly providing a6 Such issue will be discussed at length in Section 4.
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According to Feyerabend’s analysis, the deductive relationships that
ought to obtain betweenT2 and T1 in order for T2 to explainT1, and for
T1 to be reducible to T2, do not obtain, since the concept of impetus
cannot be formulated within the context of Newton’s mechan-
icsdand “this is exactly as it should be, considering the inconsistency
between some very basic principles of these two theories” (1962b, p.
57). As a consequence, the accounts of explanation and reduction
defended by the Logical Empiricists turn out to be inapplicable in the
case under consideration. Here, however, it needs to be emphasized
that Feyerabend’s discussion of such doctrineswas aimed not only at
exhibiting their descriptive inadequacy, but also at attacking the
conceptual conservatism which, he claimed, they promote. In other
words, Feyerabend viewed the conceptual change that leads to the
incommensurability between certain pairs of theories as a key
ingredient for progress.Of course, the emphasis on the importanceof
conceptual change is anything but extraneous to falsificationism;
nevertheless, in the early-to-mid-1960s Feyerabend, unlike Popper,
put the notion of incommensurability into the service of the cause of
theoretical pluralism (on this, see esp. Oberheim, 2006, chap. 5).
Our discussion above shows that, while originating within an
unmistakably Popperian framework, Feyerabend’s views on theory
testing and proliferation evolved in such a way as to lead him, by
the mid-1960s, quite far from Popper’s views. Perhaps at first
Feyerabend was not entirely clear about how far away he had
moved, and it seems that it took him some time to fully appreciate
this. In this regard it is worthmentioning that, in the first half of the
1960s, Popper resented Feyerabend for not properly acknowledging
that Popper’s writings were the actual source of ideas that Feyer-
abend pretended were his own original contributions (see Collodel,
forthcoming, Sect. 2.2.2). And although in a note to the first para-
graph of “Reply to criticism. Comments on Smart, Sellars and Put-
nam” Feyerabend claimed that he was “not aware of having
produced a single idea that is not already contained in the realistic
tradition and especially in Professor Popper’s account of it,”7 such a
solemn acknowledgment ought to be viewed also as a friendly
gesture resulting from the recommendationsmade by Lakatos, who
in the Autumn of 1964, encouraged by William W. Bartley, III and
Joseph Agassi, approached Feyerabend in order to scold him and to
“discipline his questionable intellectual conduct” (Collodel,
forthcoming). In any case, the mixed standing of Feyerabend’s
argument for theoretical pluralism has arguably played amajor role
in producing the continued disagreement between, on the one
hand, interpreters who view the early Feyerabend as someone
striving to contribute to the development of Popper’s research
program and, on the other hand, interpreters who argue that as
early as the first half of the 1960s he aimed at proposing a theory of
science which would eventually displace falsificationism. Settling
such a complicated issue is clearly beyond the scope of the present
paper. However, we devoted quite some space to what in 1965
Feyerabend had to say on theory testing and proliferation, because
his views regarding these issues are wedded to his theory of
progress as a steady increase of competing alternatives, which
marked a crucial axiological disagreement with Popper, and which
will be dealt with in Section 4.8 As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, the claimdcentral to Feyerabend’s
stancedthat refuted theories contribute to the content of their victorious rivals
seems to be a central feature of the view of science defended by Duhem, whom
Feyerabend often mentioned among his heroes.
9 Note that Feyerabend introduced the expression “ocean of alternatives” in 1965,
but he had already argued for the claims that undergird such view of knowledge4. Feyerabend’s theory of progress
As detailed above, between the end of the 1950s and the
beginning of the 1960s Popper put forward his second theory of7 In the 1981 reprint of the essay contained in Feyerabend’s Philosophical papers,
the words “and especially in Professor Popper’s account of it” were omitted (1981c
[1965], p. 104, fn. 1).progress, according towhich approximation to the truth is themain
cognitive aim of science. Feyerabend, on his part, never accepted
the claim that truth, or approximation to the truth, ought to play a
regulative role within scientific inquiry (although, as is well-
known, interpreters strongly disagree on the correct interpreta-
tion of his attitude towards scientific realism in the early 1960s: see,
e.g., Farrell, 2003, chap. 4; Oberheim, 2006, chap. 6; and Preston,
1997, chap. 4). During the 1960s Feyerabend became more and
more vociferous in his defense of pluralism, which he claimed
“must not be regarded as a preliminary stage of knowledge which
will at some time in the future be replaced by the Only True The-
ory,” since pluralism is “an essential feature of all knowledge that
claims to be objective” (1999b [1963], p. 80). By the mid-1960s,
wedded to his views concerning theory testing and proliferation
was the theory of progress as a steady increase of competing al-
ternatives, from which an ‘oceanic’ view of knowledge stemmed:
according to Feyerabend, knowledge
is not a process that converges towards an ideal view; it is an
ever-increasing ocean of alternatives, each of them forcing
the others into greater articulation, all of them contributing,
via this process of competition, to the development of our
mental faculties. All theories, even those which for the time
being have receded into the background, may be said to
possess a ‘utopian’ component in the sense that they provide
lasting, and steadily improving, measuring sticks of adequacy
for the ideas which happen to be in the centre of attention
(1981c [1965], p. 107).
In a note to this passage in which he used the Austrian poet’s
Ingeborg Bachmann words in order to challenge her views
concerning the contrast between science and literature, Feyer-
abend added that science “is an open domain,” because “its
whole past intrudes into the present” (1981c [1965], fn. 13).
Although Feyerabend did not often discuss explicitly such view
of progress and knowledge, he endorsed it for a significantly
long timedindeed, the importance of the “criticism from the
past” (1993, p. 35) is glorified in all the three editions of Against
method (1975, 1988, 1993), in which the exact same points made
above are reiterated and expanded, with some differences in
wording.8 It is important to realize how radical Feyerabend’s
views are. In fact, although Feyerabend acknowledged that,
typically, a scientific controversy comes to an end with the
victory of one of the competing alternatives, such a victory has
to be viewed, according to his theory of progress, as an only
temporary outcome: science is in fact a battlefield where alter-
natives perpetually clash with each other, and none of them
ever prevails on its adversaries once and for all.9
Unsurprisingly, Feyerabend’s theory of progressdand the view
of knowledge stemming from itdattracted harsh criticism. To
mention but one example, Hilary Putnam polemically defined
“curious” the claim which he took to be “the central contention of
Feyerabend’s papers,” i.e., the claim that, instead of aiming at cor-
rect explanations of phenomena, scientists ought to strive forand progress in previous writings, especially “Explanation, reduction and empiri-
cism” (1962b) and “How to be a good empiricist” (1999b [1963]). Feyerabend dis-
cussed at length his view of science as an enterprise characterized by the
coexistence of mutually incompatible theories especially in “Consolations for the
specialist” (1970), Sect. 6.
10 This is not meant to suggest that in the early 1960s Feyerabend’s main aim was
to contribute to the development of Popper’s research program: as mentioned
above, this is an issue on which interpreters strongly disagree, and on which we
shall remain neutral here.
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progress does not consist in convergence to the truth but, rather, in
entertaining a plurality of theories which “will later turn out to be
false, and will be superseded by new batteries of false theories”
(1975 [1965], p. 119). In any case, inwhat follows we shall gloss over
the problems facing Feyerabend’s views, and focus instead on the
compatibility of his theory of progress with Popper’s philosophy of
science.
Let us start by noting that Popper’s first theory of progress
and Feyerabend’s theory of progress exhibit a clear structural
identity, since in both cases a substantial identity between the
method and the aim of scientific inquiry is defended: just like
Popper recommended the choice of corroborated theories of ever
greater explanatory and predictive power as a method serving
the purpose to get corroborated theories of ever greater explan-
atory and predictive power, so from 1965 onwards Feyerabend
recommended the proliferation of alternatives as a method
serving the purpose of the proliferation of alternatives. As
mentioned above, although Feyerabend initially claimed that a
severe test of any theory T requires the proliferation of a set of
partially overlapping, factually adequate, but mutually inconsis-
tent theories, he later relaxeddand in the end entirely relinqui-
sheddthe requirement of factual adequacy: all alternatives, he
claimed, have a right to participate in the game of science, since
the retention of now discredited theories is an essential ingre-
dient of objective knowledge. As Feyerabend put it in 1965, his
principle of proliferation, besides recommending the invention
of alternatives to the established view, “prevents the
elimination of older theories which have been refuted” (1981c
[1965], p. 107).
In other words, by the mid-1960s Feyerabend took the principle
of proliferation to entail what he would later call the “principle of
tenacity,” dictating that one ought to stick to a promising theory
“despite considerable difficulties” (1999c [1968], p.107). At first, the
idea underlying the principle of tenacity looks very sensibledeven
trivial perhaps, since after all, the difficulties facing a newly intro-
duced theory may well turn out to be opportunities, for such the-
ory, to unleash its full potential. However, Feyerabend studiously
refrained from specifying under what conditions the defense of a
theory in the face of known difficulties becomes unreasonable, and
the scientist’s tenacity turns into sheer stubbornness. Feyerabend
often insisted that one should take refutations seriously and that no
part of our knowledge ought to be viewed as unrevisable; on one
rather isolated occasion, he went so far as to embrace what Lakatos
termed “instant rationality” (1978 [1974], p. 149) and to claim that a
theory must be “abandoned as soon as a test does not produce the
predicted result” (1962b, pp. 29e30). Nevertheless, nothing like a
principle of elimination is defended in his writings, specifying
under what conditions a theory ought to be excluded from the
game of science.
The axiological stance that Feyerabend introduced in “Reply to
criticism. Comments on Smart, Sellars and Putnam” is at cross-
purposes with the basic insight of falsificationism: the latter al-
ways revolved around the view that scientists learn by discarding
theories which experience has shown to be faulty, the former has
been aptly defined as the advocacy of an “extremely cumulativist
account of science” (Niiniluoto, 1999, p. 294). And yet the axio-
logical disagreement that, we suggest, contributes to explain
Feyerabend’s changing attitude towards falsificationism was due
not only to his radicalizing understanding of theoretical pluralism,
but also to Popper’s evolving views on the aim of science. Before the
theory of progress as approximation to the truth was introduced,
within the falsificationist framework there was quite some room
for someone wishing to explore the possibility of amendments to
Popper’s doctrines such as some of those proposed by Feyerabendin his writings.10 For instance, as Bschir (forthcoming) argues at
length, in spite of the later Feyerabend’s vocal criticisms of Popper,
Feyerabendian theoretical pluralism and Popperian critical ratio-
nalism are closer than has generally been acknowledged, and the
former can be viewed as an extension of the latter. More generally, it
seems to us that before the introduction of Popper’s second theory
of progress, the situationwithin falsificationist philosophy of science
was a bit less straightforward than Popper was willing to admit.
Famously, Popper repeatedly claimed that his methodological
proposals stem from the recognition of the asymmetry between
falsifiability and verifiability: universal statements, he emphasized,
“are never derivable from singular statements, but can be contra-
dicted by singular statements” (2002a [1935/1959], p. 19), so that a
well-established theory can be overthrown by singular statements
contradicting the predictions derived from the theory. In spite of his
insistence on such asymmetrydwhich he advertised as one of the
main reasons why the methodology of conjectures and refutations
is by far superior to its inductivist rivalsdPopper also had to admit
that “no conclusive disproof of a theory can ever be produced”
(2002a [1935/1959], p. 28), since all scientific statements are sus-
ceptible to revision. Recall, in this regard, what we said above
concerning the theoretical character of potential falsifiers, as well
as concerning the temporal subscript thatdideally at leastdcomes
attached to the assessment of the degree of corroboration of a
theory, and that characterizes the set of basic statements tenta-
tively accepted by the scientific community “to which the corrob-
oration relates (for example, by the date of its acceptance)” (2002a
[1935/1959], p. 275).
One way to look at the theory of progress and knowledge that
Feyerabend put forward in 1965 is then to consider it as an over-
extension of Popperian ideas concerning theory testing, the theory-
ladenness of observation, and the permanently tentative character
of scientific statements. And indeed, a long-standing interpretative
tradition maintains that Feyerabend’s trajectory must be viewed as
nothing but the result of “his change to a radically sceptical inter-
pretation of Popper’s own philosophy of science” (Lakatos, 1978
[1974], p. 166, fn. 2)da change leading to what John McEvoy
(1975), for one, unhesitatingly dismissed as a “degeneration.” Be
that as it may, herewe need to emphasize that, as long as the theory
of progress as increasing explanatory power was officially in place,
much of what Feyerabend defended was entirely compatible with a
falsificationist outlook. Of course, when Feyerabend proposed his
own theory of progress as a steady increase of competing alterna-
tives, he decidedly stepped out of the Popperian orthodoxy. But
such orthodoxy had, in turn, significantly changed, since after
advocating a view of science in which “it is possible to avoid using
the concepts ‘true’ and ‘false’” (2002a [1935/1959], p. 273), Popper
put forward the theory of progress as approximation to the truth. It
would perhaps have been possible, for Feyerabend, to defend his
theory of progress while maintaining an at least loose allegiance to
a (broadly conceived) Popperian framework, as long as the latter
did not entail any commitment concerning approximation to the
truth as the main cognitive aim of science; following the intro-
duction of Popper’s second theory of progress, Feyerabend’s views
could no longer be made compatible with the Popperian frame-
work, no matter how broadly conceived. Popper’s changing views
on the aim of science, we suggest, are an underestimated factor that
contributes to explain Feyerabend’s changing attitude towards
falsificationism.
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In this paper, based on the analysis of the theories of progress
and the aim of science put forward by Popper inThe logic of scientific
discovery and Conjectures and refutations (Sect. 2) and by Feyer-
abend in “Reply to criticism. Comments on Smart, Sellars and
Putnam” (Sect. 3 and Sect. 4), we argued that Popper’s changing
views on the aim of science constitute an underestimated factor
that contributes to account for Feyerabend’s changing attitude to-
wards falsificationism. However, not for a moment do we mean to
imply that Popper’s proposing the theory of progress as increasing
approximation to the truth provides the explanation of Feyer-
abend’s more and more vociferous criticism of Popperian philoso-
phy of sciencedindeed, we doubt that one such explanation is
possible, and this for at least three reasons.
First of all, the FeyerabendePopper relation was a long-term,
multifaceted one, that involved intertwined intellectual and per-
sonal issuesdon which, as is well-known, Feyerabend returned
time and time again in various writings (especially in Killing time,
1996), providing sometimes conflicting, and sometimes unreliable,
reports.
Secondly, and consequently, even when the attention is
restricted to purely intellectual matters, things are in any case
complicated: perhaps due to the fact that it took Feyerabend some
time to fully appreciate how far away he had moved from the
Popperian orthodoxy, interpreters must deal with a somewhat
twisted storyline. For instance, thanks to Collodel’s work
(forthcoming) we now know that, at the end of the 1950s, Feyer-
abend himself suggested to Popper the idea of a collection of his
most recent papers, thereby playing a role in bringing about the
publication of Conjectures and refutations, which Feyerabend vol-
unteered to review. In a more than enthusiastic, and less than one
page long piece, published in Isis, he concealed any disagreement
with his former mentor and hailed the book as “a major contribu-
tion to philosophy [.] whose publication constitutes a major event
in the history of this subject” (1965, p. 88). Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine a more unhesitating endorsement of Popper’s philosophy
than the one witnessed by this review; and yet, in 1965 Feyerabend
was advocating a theory of progress which is incompatible with
that introduced in Conjectures and refutations.
Thirdly, and to our mind more importantly, Popper’s philosophy
is a complex system of ideas, and depending on the specific aspect
of such system onwhich one decides to focus, Feyerabendmay look
closer to, or farther from, his former mentor. To briefly mention but
one example concerning the later Feyerabend’s output, Preston has
contended that it was due to his Popperian legacy that Feyerabend
chose to attack methodological monismdaccording to which there
is one set of rules of method underlying all good scientific practi-
cedin the way he did: by exhibiting historical cases in which
progress has been achieved despite the violation of rules. Feyer-
abend’s criticism of monism, Preston suggests, crucially relies on
the assumption that rules must be exceptionless deductive ones: in
this regard, the Feyerabend of Against method turns out to be “a
Popperian deductivistmanqué” (1997, p. 174), since just like Popper,
whose characterization of the proper method of science he vehe-
mently criticized, he denied the possibility of an inductive justifi-
cation of rules. If Preston’s suggestion is correct, then the later
Feyerabend was, in this respect, much closer to Popper than he
would have liked to admit.
Nevertheless our discussion suggests that, when it comes to
axiological issues, as early as 1965 Feyerabend’s philosophy evolved
in such a way as to be incompatible with Popper’s second theory of
progress. In this regard our account contradicts, for instance, Robert
Farrell’s claim that Feyerabend always “remained a faithful Pop-
perian” in that he believed “that the aim of science consists incritical explanatory progress” (2003, p. 156). Although Popper al-
ways maintained that the method of conjectures and refutations,
recommending the choice of ever more general, explanatory the-
ories, promotes progress, starting from the late 1950seearly 1960s
he characterized the aim of science as approximation to the truth.
And when the attempt is made to explain Feyerabend’s disavowal
of falsificationism, an accurate account ought to include not only
Feyerabend’s move away from Popper’s views, but also Popper’s
move away from his own originary views.
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